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Abstract— Currently Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) 
attacks have been identified as one of the most serious problems 
on the Internet. The aim of DDoS attacks is to prevent legitimate 
users from accessing desired resources, such as network 
bandwidth. Hence the immediate task of DDoS defense is to 
provide as much resources as possible to legitimate users when 
there is an attack. Unfortunately most current defense 
approaches can not efficiently detect and filter out attack traffic. 
Our approach is to find the network anomalies by using neural 
network, deploy the system at distributed routers, identify the 
attack packets, and then filter them. The marks in the IP header 
that are generated by a group of IP traceback schemes, 
Deterministic Packet Marking (DPM)/Flexible Deterministic 
Packet Marking (FDPM), assist this process of identifying attack 
packets. The experimental results show that this approach can be 
used to defend against both intensive and subtle DDoS attacks, 
and can catch DDoS attacks’ characteristic of starting from 
multiple sources to a single victim. According to results, we find 
the marks in IP headers can enhance the sensitivity and accuracy 
of detection, thus improve the legitimate traffic throughput and 
reduce attack traffic throughput. Therefore, it can perform well 
in filtering DDoS attack traffic precisely and effectively. 
Keywords-Filtering; DDoS; neural network; traceback; packet 
marking 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks have been a 
serious problem on today’s Internet. A DDoS attack is 
characterized by an explicit attempt from an attacker to prevent 
legitimate users from using the desired resources [8]. Many 
defense approaches have been proposed to fight against DDoS 
attacks, such as filtering [9], traceback [1], congestion control 
[11] and replication [27]. However, it is still difficult to solve 
the notorious problem ultimately. The reasons lie in two facts. 
One is the DDoS tools are easy to get and use, thus even an 
inexperienced hacker can launch the attack effortlessly. The 
other reason is that it is difficult to separate the attack traffic 
from legitimate traffic, and then remove the attack traffic.  
Recently many researchers focus their interests on IP 
traceback. IP traceback is the ability to trace IP packets to their 
origins without relying on the source address field in the IP 
header; it provides a system with the ability to identify true 
sources of the IP packets. This ability is beneficial to locate the 
attackers and provide judicial evidences for forensics. Many 
traceback schemes have been proposed, such as link testing [5] 
[22], messaging [3], logging [20] and packet marking [19] [4]. 
Packet marking traceback overwrites some fields in the IP 
header, which are called marks. In particular, an improved 
DPM scheme, Flexible Deterministic Packet Marking (FDPM) 
[25], requires a small number of IP packets to find out more 
sources than other schemes, and has a built-in overload 
prevention mechanism to intelligently mark packets when 
system is overloaded in high-speed networks. Instead of 
investigating traceback schemes, we present a mark-aided 
distributed filtering approach in this paper, which utilizes the 
marks of DPM/FDPM to filter out attack traffic. According to 
experimental results, we find this system can sensitively and 
accurately detect anomalies caused by DDoS, thus provides 
high legitimate traffic throughput and reduce attack traffic 
throughput. 
Our contributions in this paper are that we propose an 
effective DDoS defense mechanism to differentiate the 
legitimate traffic and attack traffic (which can offer most of 
network resources to legitimate users); explore the 
effectiveness of using traceback technique to filter DDoS 
attack traffic; and apply neural network in finding network 
anomalies. 
II. SYSTEM OUTLINE 
Before the system design is described, we have a brief look 
at the FDPM [25]. As it is shown in figure 1, the encoding 
module is deployed at the edge routers that are close to the 
attack source end. When packets enter the network, they are 
dynamically marked by the encoding modules, which will 
change marking rate depending on the load of routers. The 
marks comprise of protocol control bits, address bits, address 
digest bits and segment number. When the packets reach the 
victim end, the source IP addresses of entry points can be 
reconstructed.  
In the marks that FDPM uses, the address digest bits in 
different IP packets are always the same for one entry point. If 
the attacker sends attack packets, in a large traffic volume, or in 
a certain rate (eg. 300KBps), through one entry point, there will 
be a special pattern of marked packets with the same 
destination IP address and address digest bits. Therefore, in a 
global view, there will be a pattern with several groups of 
packets with corresponding address digest bits, and the same 
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destination IP address. The pattern reflexes clearly the 
character of DDoS traffic that come from multiple sources and 
aggregate at one destination. This information is especially 
beneficial to  
• Find out attack traffic; and 
• Remove them from legitimate traffic. 
 
Figure 1.  System architecture. 
Our system utilizes the marks of FDPM, and is deployed 
between the source end (one hop behind FDPM encoding 
module) and victim end. The system has two parts, Offline 
Training System (OTS) and Online Filtering System (OFS). 
The Offline Training System (OTS) is a lightweight neural 
network with back-propagation algorithm [10]. This offline 
system collects traffic characteristics and trains the neural 
network without influencing the normal operation of the 
network. It is usually deployed close to the victim end, in order 
to obtain better training result. Actually, it can be deployed at 
any point in the protected network. To save the computation 
time, trained neural networks can also be serialized and be 
shared for different Online Filtering Systems (OFSs). In this 
neural network program, a serialized file is from 100kb to 
330kb, which is convenient to be exchanged periodically to 
other OFSs.  
The OFS provides the fast decision making function to find 
the attack signals. Just as the OTS, it can be deployed at any 
point in the protected network. If it is deployed close to the 
attack source end, it can protect even better the rest of network 
from it to victim, because the attack traffic has been removed 
before it travels to the victim, without causing overall network 
congestion. When the attack is confirmed, those packets with 
the same address digest bits are filtered out. 
III. SYSTEM DESIGN 
A. Design of neural network 
Although current Internet traffic resembles a stochastic 
manner, we may still have prior knowledge to the traffic status 
relevant to traffic classification problems. This prior 
knowledge has also been applied in many anomaly detection 
methods, such as statistical method [16] and CUSUM [18]. The 
high nonlinearity of the Internet traffic makes it difficult to 
apply these methods to describe precisely and regulate the 
traffic. Neural network is one of the tools that allow an 
anomaly detection system to learn the nonlinearity and at the 
same time, implement linear discriminants. We apply one of 
the most popular methods for training based on gradient 
descent in error, back-propagation algorithm to detect traffic 
anomalies. 
There are 3 layers in this neural network, input layer, 
hidden layer and output layer. The number of the units in the 
input layer is dictated by the dimensionality of the input 
vectors (features of traffic). There is one unit in the output 
layer, representing a value between 0 and 1 (legitimate and 
attack traffic, respectively). The number of hidden units that 
governs the expressive power of the net will be introduced in 
the later part. Here we only apply one hidden layer because it 
suffices the requirement of preciseness and efficiency. The 
input layer is a linear layer and the other two are sigmoid layer 
with transfer function 
)1,0(),1/(1 ∈+= − yey x )1(  
In the training phase the desired output must be 0 or 1, and 
in the test phase the output is between 0 and 1. We use cross 
entropy as the error criterion function to control the iteration. 
The cross entropy for n patterns can be written as 
!
=
=
n
m
mmm zttJ
1
)/ln()(w )2(  
Where tm and zm are the target and the actual value of output 
unit for pattern m, when there is 1 output unit; w is the weight. 
The optimal learning rate !opt that satisfies the requirement of 
convergence and minimum training error can be written as 
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B. Features for input 
TABLE I.  FEATURES USED (NUMBER PER CERTAIN PERIOD) 
Feature Description Protocol 
SrcIP Number of source IP address Any 
DestIP Number of destination IP address Any 
SrcPort Number of source port Any 
DestPort Number of destination port Any 
Length Total length of packets Any 
Chksum Number of wrong checksum Any 
SYN Number of  SYN flag TCP 
FIN Number of  FIN flag TCP 
ACK Number of  ACK flag TCP 
Mark Concentration of the packets with 
same digest bits 
Any 
We use several extracted network traffic features as the 
input of the neural network for training and test, as shown in 
table 1, and let the output as the likelihood of attack packets. 
We apply time window to collect the information of network 
traffic. Besides the common packet features, the mark (address 
digest bits) that the FDPM writes into the IP header, is also 
concerned. Let 
digestsofNumberPacketsofNumberxmark __/__= )4(  
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This feature means the concentration of the packets that 
have same digest bits. In practice, we adjust the scale of this 
special feature, to let the neural network adjust weights from it 
more than other features during training, because if the neural 
network prefers this feature over the others, it will be more 
sensitive to DDoS attacks, according to our experiments. Let 
markmark xx β=' )5(  
where x’mark and xmark  are the adjusted mark feature and the 
original mark feature respectively, and " is the scaling ratio. 
C. Tuning neural network 
In this section, we will introduce how to tune parameters of 
the neural network by experiments. The details of experiments 
including data and simulation will be presented later. The 
neural network parameters are learning rate, momentum, and 
number of hidden units. The learning rate will affect the speed 
at which the neural network attains a minimum in the criterion 
function J(w). By experiences we choose this value 0.78. 
Momentum allows the neural network to learn more quickly by 
altering the learning rule in stochastic back-propagation to 
include some faction of the previous weight update. By 
experiences we choose this value 0.32. 
Theoretically, more hidden units can deal with more 
complex nonlinear problem. However, the training error and 
test error should be small enough while moderate number of 
hidden units is chosen. After tuning in the experiments, we 
found the optimal value of number of hidden units is between 
19 and 21, as it is shown in figure 2. 
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Figure 2.  Choose number of hidden units. 
D. Online Filtering System(OFS) 
The Online Filtering System (OFS) detects network 
anomalies and find the attack traffic according to the trained 
neural network. When the attack is confirmed, those packets 
with specific marks as the attack packets are filtered out. We 
test the incoming packets by the trained neural network. If the 
output indicates anomalies, we further investigate the 
composition of marked packets. If the number of packets that 
have the same address digest bits exceeds a threshold Ndrop (this 
value is decided by experience), this flow of packets will be 
filtered. Here flow means the packets have the same destination 
IP address and digest bits. 
This two-step design can not only protect legitimate traffic 
that shares a large portion of bandwidth but also punish entirely 
the attack traffic. First, because the anomaly detection is 
performed by a nonlinear neural network classifier with the 
assistance of concentration of the packets of same digest bits, 
the legitimate traffic will be less likely decided as an anomaly 
than by other coarse granite classifier such as statistical model. 
Second, once the attack traffic flow is identified, this flow can 
be totally filtered by differentiating the identity – digest bits 
that FDPM marks. 
IV. EXPERIMENTS AND EVALUATION 
A. Finding anomalies by neural network 
In order to test the capability of the neural network to find 
anomalies, we conduct experiments by using two public data 
sets. One is 1998 DARPA Intrusion Detection Evaluation Data 
Set at Lincoln laboratory, MIT [17]. The other is sanitized 
UCLA CSD traffic traces from D-WARD project [23]. We 
extract the features of interest in MIT data sets with time 
window of 10 seconds. The training data include one week data 
and a four-hour subset of training data. The features include all 
the features in table 1 except Mark. The features extracted in 
UCLA data sets are SrcIP, DestIP, SrcPort, DestPort, and 
Length. We test different types of attacks (maximum attack 
rate is 300KBps) such as constant rate attack, pulsing attack 
and increasing rate attack. 
By using different training data set and testing data set, we 
obtain the fitted ROC curves as figure 3. A ROC curve is a plot 
with the false positive rate on the X axis and the true positive 
rate on the Y axis. It can reflect the sensitivity of the neural 
network by measuring the area below the curve. The point (0, 
1) is the perfect classifier: it classifies all positive cases and 
negative cases correctly. It is (0, 1) because the false positive 
rate is 0 (none), and the true positive rate is 1 (all). From the 
figures we can see under each situation the area below the 
curve is nearly equal to 1, which proofs the neural network 
approach can detect anomalies sensitively and accurately.  
B. DDoS simulation 
Currently there is very few data that can describe the whole 
profile of a DDoS attack. Therefore, besides the MIT and 
UCLA data sets, we also use the data generated by SSFNet 
[21] simulator and the embedded DDoS tools [7] in project 
Distributed Denial of Service Simulators at Deakin University. 
The reasons of choosing simulator to generate data are first, to 
obtain control hardware resources such as hosts and networks 
could be very expensive; second, although to launch DDoS 
attacks in a laboratory or in real world network and collect data 
could be direct, it might not be legal; third, it is not easy to 
change real network topology to create different scenarios; and 
finally, it is difficult to control the attack process in a real 
environment because there are too many factors that can affect 
the result.  
In the above project, two DDoS tools, TFN2K and Trinoo, 
are adopted and integrated into SSFNet to create virtual DDoS 
networks to simulate the attacks. The TFN2K and Trinoo are 
originally written in C language. They are ported to Java to be 
embedded into SSFNet. By the DDoS simulators, we can 
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launch any DDoS attack with different features such as 
duration, protocol, attack rate, etc. 
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Figure 3.  MIT, UCLA and simulation ROC curves. 
In order to simulate the DDoS attack as real as possible, we 
also use the real Internet topology from Cooperative 
Association for Internet Data Analysis (CAIDA)’s Skitter 
project [6]. The data set used is generated from server aroot 
ipv4.20040120 on 09/Jan/2004. To simplify the problem, we 
connect all routers by 100M network interfaces. We randomly 
choose the 1000 attack hosts and let the rest be legitimate 
clients, and let the Skitter server be the victim. Constant rate 
attack of 300KBps is applied to all attack hosts. According to 
the hop distribution (number of routers between the victim and 
its clients), most of the clients locate in the distance between 10 
hops and 25 hops. Therefore, we deploy the FDPM encoding 
module at routers 10 hops from the victim, and the mark-aided 
distributed filtering systems at routers from 1 to 9 hops from 
the victim. 
To test the sensitivity and accuracy of neural network in the 
simulation, we apply TFN2K to launch the attacks and obtain 
the ROC curve. From the comparison in the last of figure 3 we 
can see if there is no mark-aided feature used to train the neural 
network, the area below the ROC curve is smaller than the 
mark-aided approaches. We also adjust the scaling ratio " in 
equation (5) to get different results. When "=10 the neural 
network can obtain better detection result than "=1(no input is 
scaled) and "=100. It is shown that the parameter " can affect 
the sensitivity and accuracy of neural network. However, how 
to set a best value still needs more research. 
C. Performance 
The ultimate goals of our system are to find out the attack 
traffic as accurately as possible, and to filter out the attack 
traffic as much as possible and at the mean time let as much 
legitimate traffic pass through as possible (but not to detect 
anomalies). Therefore, the performance metrics are average 
value of legitimate traffic passed rate (LTPR) and attack traffic 
passed rate (ATPR) of distributed filtering systems. We deploy 
the mark-aided distributed filtering system at different 
distances from the victim and conduct experiments based on 
both TFN2K and Trinoo DDoS tools. Random algorithms in 
SSFNet are used to generate legitimate traffic. After the neural 
network is trained, the DDoS tools are initiated to start the 
attack with 300KBps attack rate. Then the traffic on the 
deployment points is monitored. Figure 4 shows the average 
values of LTPR and ATPR at routers that locate at different 
hops from the victim. From the figures we can see our scheme 
can filter out most of the attack traffic and let most of the 
legitimate traffic pass through. These two figures also show 
that both LTPR and ATPR decrease slightly if the defense 
systems are deployed close to the attack source end. This 
proofs this system can be deployed at any place in the protect 
network. Actually, if the filtering system is deployed close to 
the attack source end, it can protect the rest of the network 
from congestion. 
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Figure 4.  Performance with different deployment positions. 
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Figure 5.  Performance with different marking rates at hop=1. 
FDPM can change its marking rate dynamically at its 
encoding modules according to the load of participating 
routers. This ability can intelligently find the most possible 
attack packets to be marked. From figure 5 we can see that the 
performance of LTPR and ATPR change according to the 
marking rate. Moreover, if attacking packet rate increases, our 
scheme can let even more legitimate packets pass through, and 
filter more attacking packets. 
V. RELATED WORK 
A. Anomaly detection methods  
DDoS attacks usually cause network anomalies. Statistical 
method [16] is a straight forward method to detect anomalies. 
However, it requires a strong assumption that the network 
traffic variables obey a Normal Distribution. Another popular 
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method to detect anomalies is nonparametric Cumulative Sum 
(CUSUM) method [18]. It is stateless, lightweight, and 
sensitive to persistent sudden changes caused by DDoS attacks 
instead of Internet flash crowd. This method has been used to 
detect many DDoS anomalies such as SYN flood [24]. 
However, this method can only consider one network feature, 
and can only deal with the change point problem. If the 
network anomaly is not an intensive flood, this method may 
not discover the attack timely. 
Rather than analyzing the change of features, multivariate 
correlation analysis [14] [28] that is proposed to detect subtle 
DDoS attacks considers the correlations among the features. 
Loss of self-similarity [2] is also a representation of 
relationships between features. However, there is no theoretical 
proof to decide which features are valid for the correlation 
models and how important each feature is. Additionally, those 
methods can only represent the changes of correlation, but not 
the causality between those changes and attacks. 
B. Filtering methods 
Ingress filtering [9] is proposed to be deployed on the 
external interface of a network and drops all spoofed incoming 
packets. It requires a global deployment and also a knowledge 
base of legitimate IP addresses that can be very large. Other 
filtering methods such as router-based Distributed Packet 
Filtering (DPF) [22] and Hop-Count Filtering (HCF) [13] are 
proposed to drop spoofed IP packets by detecting the network 
features such as the number of hops a packet takes to reach its 
destination. Some filtering approaches [11] [12] depend on 
network congestion, which means only intensive congestion 
can trigger the filtering mechanisms. Both Path Identifier (PI) 
[26] and Deterministic Bit Marking (DBM) [15] create a path 
signature for all the packets originating from the same location 
upon arriving at a destination. By identifying this signature it 
isolates and filters DDoS traffic. However, the detection is 
affected by the distance in number of router hops, resulting in 
low detection rate if the attacks come from hosts that are far 
away from the victim. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we present a distributed filtering system by 
utilizing the marks that DPM/FDPM writes into the IP header. 
Neural network is applied to detect the network anomalies. The 
experimental results show that our approach is sensitive and 
accurate in finding DDoS attacks. It can filter out most of 
attack traffic, and let most of legitimate traffic pass through.  
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